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CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS-OVERRIDE CLAUSES
UNDER SECTION 33-WHETHER SUBJECTTO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SEC-
TION l .-Under section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,' Parliament or a provincial legislature may enact a clause
exempting legislation from the application ofcertain Charter provisions . It
is commonly assumed that an override clause complying with section 33
takes effect automatically and is not subject to judicial review under the
Charter. However, respectable arguments can be made to the contrary . I
will set out one such argument here and briefly review the main objections
to it .
Let us look first at the terms of section 33 . Z The section states that
Parliament or a provincial legislature may expressly declare in an Act that
the Act as a whole or a particular provision thereof shall operate notwith
standing a provision found in any of sections 2 or 7 to 15 of the Charter .
Where such a declaration is in effect, the Act or provision covered "shall
have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter
referred to in the declaration" . A declaration automatically ceases to take
effect after five years, but is subject to reenactment .
The Charter provisions affected by section 33 contain some of the
document's most important guarantees . Section 2 deals with "fundamental
freedoms", including the freedoms of conscience, expression, assembly
1 The Charter is embodied in ss 1-34 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of the
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K .) .
z The complete text of the section is as follows:
33 .-(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or ofthe legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter .
(2) An Actor aprovision ofan Act in respect ofwhich adeclaration madeunder this section
is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter
referred to in the declaration .
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it
comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration .
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under
subsection (1) .
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4) .
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and association . Sections 7 to 14 cover "legal rights", most notably the
right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice . Section 15 embodies "equality rights", that is the guarantee of
equality before the law without discrimination based on race, ethnic origin,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical handicap .
The question is this . Assuming that an override clause meets the
requirements of section 33, is it immune to judicial review under the
Charter no matter how extreme the statutory provision it protects? Can a
person in Canada be arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured to death by
executive flat under anti-terrorist legislation, so long as appropriate over-
ride clauses are present? At first blush, the answer appears to be affirma-
tive . The right to life, liberty and security of the person, the right not to be
arbitrarily detained, the right to habeas cot-pits, the right to be tried within a
reasonable time, and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
treatment are all subject to declarations under section 33 . Where an
override clause exists, the legislation takes effect notwithstanding the
Charter provision specified, apparently regardless of the statute's charac-
ter. The paradoxical conclusion is that, while the Charter enshrines the
right of Canadian citizens to vote in a section immune to override clauses, it
ultimately fails to shield citizens from arbitrary imprisonment and torture
for their political beliefs.
The issue is whether this conclusion is compatible with the basic
guarantee found in section 1 of the Charter . This section states :
The Canadian CharterofRights andFreedotns guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society .
The provision affirms that the Charter as awhole guarantees the rights set
out in it, that is, shields those rights from violation and ensures their
exercise . The guarantee is not absolute . It is stated to be subject to limits
prescribed by law . But the limits must be reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. No other types of limitation are
allowed for. Limits which do not satisfy these criteria are invalid . This
sanction flows from section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which
provides that any law inconsistent with the Constitution ofCanada is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect .
It seems plain that a declaration enacted under section 33, if it has any
effect at all, serves to limit rights guaranteed by the Charter. Such a clause
prevents a Charter provision from applying to a statute which it would
otherwise govern . It presùpposes a conflict between the Charter and the
statute and provides that the statute shall operate notwithstanding the
Charter provision in question . If no conflict actually exists, the clause is
merely a superfluous precaution and does not place any real limits on
Charter rights . But where the statute actually infringes the Charter provi-
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sion in question, the declaration prevents the Charter from nullifying the
statute andconsequently limits the right guaranteed . It seems to follow that
such a declaration is a limit prescribed by lawwithin the meaningofsection
1, andso must satisfy the criteria laid down there before taking effect . That
is, it must be "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society" . In brief, section 33 represents an elaboration of the
scheme envisaged in section 1 rather than an exception to it .
There seems to be nothing in the wording of either section 1 or section
33 to negate this interpretation . If override clauses were meant to be wholly
exempt from the standard of reasonableness in section 1, it would have
been simple enoughto indicate this . That section could have been drafted to
read : " . . . subject only to declarations under section 33 and to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law . . ." . Alternately, section 33 could
have been fortified with the phrase "notwithstanding section 1" or "not-
withstanding anything in this Charter", such as one finds in section 28 . It
seemsnoteworthy that, while section 33 authorizes the override ofsections
2 and 7 to 15, it does not even mention section 1 .
On this view, section 1 covers two different sorts ofstatutory limits on
Charterrights . The first is that imposed by a statute standing alone, without
an override clause . The second type is that effected by a declaration under
section 33. Both kinds of restrictions are subject to the standard of reason-
ableness laid down in section 1 . Butthe standard operates differently in the
two instances .
In the first case, where no override clause exists, the question is
simply whether the limitation imposed by the statute is reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society . The court must
make up its own mind on the matter and, if its view differs from that of the
legislature, strike down the offending provision. Whereadeclaration under
section 33 is present, the issue will be different. What the court must now
decide is whether it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in the cir-
cumstances that the statute should be exempted from judicial review for
non-compliance with the relevant Charter provision . Given that section 33
expressly empowers a legislature to shield a statute from judicial scrutiny,
is this an instance where that power can reasonably and justifiably be
exercised? Several criteria might be suggested forresolving this issue. One
important criterion, if not necessarily the only one, would be whether it is
reasonably possible to interpret the relevant Charter provision, considered
together with section 1, as consistent with the statute . If, on some sensible
reading ofthe Charter, the statute canbe sustained, then the override clause
should normally be held to bar further judicial inquiries, even where the
court itself does not consider that reading correct. But if the statute cannot
on any reasonable view be .reconciled with the Charter, then the override
declaration should be struck down.
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Suppose that the Canadian Parliament revives the death penalty as a
mandatory punishment for murder . 3 The provision is challenged in the
courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada rules in a majority decision that a
compulsory death penalty, without anyallowance forjudicial discretion, is
a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of section 12, and that
its imposition is notjustified under section 1 .4 Parliament then reenacts the
same provision, but adds a declaration under section 33 . The matter once
more comes before the Supreme Court. What the court must now assess is
not the merits of the provision as such but the propriety of the override
clause . Is this a case where the legislature's view of the scope ofthe Charter
can properly be substituted for that of a court? The court would, I expect,
hold that the question of the death penalty's conformity with the Charter
was one on which reasonable persons, sharing the same commitment to a
free and democratic society, might well disagree . On that basis alone, the
override clause should be upheld .
Another example maysharpen the point. Shortly after the outbreak of
war, Parliament passes legislation subjecting the press and other media to
censorship for the war's duration . The statute contains a declaration that the
Act will operate notwithstanding section 2(b) ofthe Charter, which guaran-
tees freedom of expression . Here a court could well hold that, even if the
statute could not on any reasonable view be reconciled with section 2(b)
itself, it represented the kind of limitation on freedom of expression which
reasonable people could consider justified under section 1, and sustain the
override clause on that basis . In other words, the test of reasonable
conformity entails consideration of both the Charter right itself and the
limits permitted by section 1 . The question is : could a reasonable indi-
vidual, reading the Charter provision in the light of section 1, conclude that
the statute in question is justified? If the answer is affirmative, the override
declaration will be effective and protect the statute from further judicial
scrutiny .
A majority of statutes covered by declarations under section 33 will
probably satisfy the test of reasonable conformity, and be accepted by the
courts on that basis . Butone can imagine examples of a different character.
In a time of severe economic depression, the tide of popular feeling in a
Canadian province turns against the members of a minority racial group. A
weak provincial government, harried by the inflammatory rhetoric of an
opposition party and fearing defeat in forthcoming elections, passes leg-
islation confiscating the major property holdings of members of the group,
without touching the property of any other persons . The statute is covered
by an override clause ousting section 15 of the Charter, which guarantees
equality under the law without discrimination based on race . Here the
3 Abolished in 1976 ; see S.C . 1974-75-76, c. 105.
4 Reversing its holding in R . v. Miller and Cockriell (1976) . 70 D.L.R . (3d) 324
(S.C.C .) .
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courts could (and should) properly hold that the confiscatory measures bear
no reasonable relation to the Charter guarantee of racial equality read in the
light of section 1 . That is, under no honest reading of the Charter can the
statute be sustained. ®n this basis, the override clause would be held
invalid under section 1, and the legislation voided for non-conformity with
section 15 .
The argument canbe summarized as follows . The Charter is a solemn
declaration of basic rights binding not only on the courts but also on the
various Canadian governments and legislatures . The courts are, however,
placed in a special position . Generally speaking, they are entrusted with
determining the scope of the Charter, and can strike down legislation and
other governmental acts violating its terms . In the case of most. Charter
provisions, that determination is final and cannot be revised extra-
judicially except by constitutional amendment. With sections 2 and7 to 15,
the position is different . Here the Charter enables the legislature to act as
final arbiter of the Charter's meaning, to the exclusion of the courts, by
enacting an override clause . Two major limits are placed on that power.
The legislature is compelled to review its determination at least once every
five years. Secondly, its acts must bear a reasonable relation to the
Charter's terms. Enforcement of these limits is left to the courts . In short,
section 33 does not authorize Canadian legislatures to overturn or reverse
completely the Charter's solemn guarantees . Rather, it gives legislatures
the opportunity to act as final judge of the scope of certain Charter
provisions, within reasonable limits .
Several objections may be made to this interpretation . One could
argue that a section 33 declaration effectively excises from the Charter the
rights provision to which it refers for purposes of the legislation protected .
Section 1 guarantees only the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter,
and so cannot apply to a right effaced from the document by the operation
of an override clause . The difficulty with this argument is that it presup-
poses the very proposition which is itself in question, namely that a given
override clause is legally effective. If it is effective, clearly the Charter
provision named in the clause does not apply to the legislation protected;
the provision is, if you will, "excised" from the Charter for a limited
purpose. The preliminary question, however, is whether the override
clause is valid. In the words of section 33(2) is it "in effect"? No
affirmative answer canbe givenuntil it is shown thatthe standardlaid down
in section 1 has been met. This standard governs all limits on Charter
rights . An override clause is one such limit.
A second objection is different in character . It contends that the
interpretation advanced here does not conform with the historical inten-
tions of the drafters of the new Constitution of Canada, and in particular
with the spirit ofthe federal-provincial agreement ofNovember 5th, 1981,
which gave .rise to section 33. The argument raises a number of interesting
issues that cannot be fully considered here . One major question is how far
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the courts should allow resort to external documentation throwing light on
the minds ofpersons involved in the drafting and enactment ofthe Charter .
There is the further problem of whose historical intentions are relevant in
this regard . The new Constitution is formally an enactment of the British
Parliament proceeding on a joint resolution of the Canadian House of
Commons and Senate, a resolution that itself bears the marks of many
hands. Any investigation of the historical objectives lying behind section
33 must deal with a formidable array of contributing parties, including the
provincial premiers that lobbied for the section, the federal government
which agreed to include it, the civil servants that drafted it, the members of
the Canadian House of Commons and Senate which approved it, and the
members of the British Parliament which passed it into law . Can any
agreement among these diverse individuals and groups be assumed,
beyond concurrence on the actual wording of sections 1 and 33?
In any case, the argument from historical intentions must go to some
lengths to counter the interpretation presented here . It would not be
sufficient to show merely that the parties to the drafting and enactment of
the Charter intended that Canadian legislatures should have the final say on
the interpretation ofsections 2 and 7 to 15, for no one disputes that point. It
must be demonstrated that the aim was to allow a legislature to suppress
entirely the rights enshrined in those sections without any reasonable
grounds,-to establish a regime of apartheid, silence political dissent,
sanction a policy of state terror . Can any significant body of evidence be
mustered to support this view? I draw comfort from the words of the then
Minister of Justice of Canada, Mr. Jean Chr6tien, in introducing section 33
to the Canadian House of Commons:
It is important at the outset to understand that the entire Charter of Rights and
Freedoms will be entrenched in the Constitution and that no province will be able to
opt out ofany provision ofthe Charter. The agreement signed by the Prime Minister
and nine Premiers does not emasculate the Charter . Democratic rights, fundamental
freedoms, mobility rights, legal rights, equality rights and language rights are all
enshrined in the Constitution and apply across the land .
What the Premiers and the Prime Minister agreed to is a safety valve which is
unlikely ever to be used except in non-controversial circumstances by Parliament or
legislatures to override certain sections of the Charter. The purpose of an override
clause is to provide the flexibility that is required to ensure that legislatures rather than
judges have the final say on important matters of public policy .'
I suggest that the position advanced here, which allows to legislatures
a final say on the interpretation of sections 2 and 7 to 15 ofthe Charter, but
prevents the complete suppression of the rights guaranteed there, conforms
better to the spirit of Mr. Chr6tien's words than a view under which section
' Canada, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 20th, 1981 . Vol. 124, number 260, p.
13042,
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33 is a free ticket to religious, political, or racial persecution. What the
latter view envisages is less a safety valve than. a hole in the bottom of the
boiler .
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